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ABSTRACT 
Gadamer’s concept of a historically effected consciousness denotes that we cannot help but 
experience the world through our prejudices and the horizons in which they subsist. Placed within 
a larger interpretive framework, such that the subject matters of our experiences can always be 
reinterpreted anew, our horizons also function as the linguistic media through which novel 
experiences become possible – a historically effective consciousness, as they say. This paper seeks 
to explore an uncertainty in Gadamer’s hermeneutics from the perspective of the dynamic within 
this historically effected and effective consciousness, that being the uncertainty of how one ought 
to evaluate the progress of their interpretive understanding regarding some subject matter. I argue 
that Gadamer’s failure to escape from this uncertainty can be motivated by two claims reasonably 
attributable to his hermeneutics: one, a subject matter is sufficiently interpreted when an 
interpreter’s horizon is consciously given as infinitely structured, and two, an interpreter cannot in 
practice ever achieve this sufficiency. 
1. Introductory Remarks: Historically Effected Consciousness 
Gadamer takes the notion of prejudice as integral to our subjective experience of the world 
(Cf. Gadamer 1976, 9; 2004, 272ff.). We can also infer from the further fact that prejudiced 
perspectives can change over time some obvious consequences. First is that, as stated by Joseph 
Cunningham (2017), “[w]e cannot recreate original experiences; the temporality of experiences 
enforces this restriction” (51). Second, the conception of one’s interpretive faculties as prejudiced 
means that they are subjectively limited and partial. Thus, while a temporal distance augments 
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difficulty in returning to some original past understanding, in combination with a partial 
subjectivity both entail that we cannot ever judge for certain whether we have adopted an 
authentically representative understanding (Cf., Gadamer 1985, 281-2; 2004, 159). 
Our interpretive powers are conditioned in a dual manner though. As indicated above, the 
first instance is that, insofar as we are discussing a limited subjectivity, we are already given to 
our experiences by a temporally present bias – any understanding of the past is qualified by a 
present perspectival baggage (Leiviskä 2015, 591), which we recognize as the influence of an 
inherited tradition and culture. Nonetheless, in attaining a cultural situatedness, one is not left 
completely interpretively blind – our prejudice itself can promote a particular type of 
understanding. Habermas (1988) regards this understanding as informing our partial knowledge of 
“the tradition with which we are confronted” in every instance of appropriating said tradition for 
interpretation (152. Cf. Gadamer 2004, 280-1). As knowledge, it allows us to be aware “of the 
ways in which we are effected by history”; as partial, it implies “awareness of our inability to be 
fully conscious of all the ways in which we are preconditioned” (Leiviskä 2015, 591). Gadamer 
(2004) calls this knowledge a “historically effected consciousness”, or HEdC (301), in that what 
may be constitutive of said historical effect is a consciousness of “the human aspect of things, the 
system of man's needs and interests” (433).1 
This is not the full story though, for our subjectivity is conditioned in a further second 
manner, as a temporally situated reality. Here, we characterize our subjectivity in terms of its 
historicity, inasmuch as we are dealing with our temporal distanciation from the past, whereby a 
 
1 Other readers of Gadamer, such as Xinli Wang (2018), associate the HEdC as an integral factor in how language 
grants cultural usage thereof its conceptual presuppositions (565), which are inescapably anthropocentrically imbibed. 
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meaningful examination of the past is not completely precluded from us. In other words, not only 
does our subjectivity supply interpretation with its limitations via the HEdC, it can also mediate 
intelligibly between past and present states of affairs to give us epistemically relevant, albeit not 
certain, “ways back to the past” (Cunningham 2017, 35. Cf. Schuster 2013, 198; Leiviskä 2015, 
589). Chung-Ying Cheng (2015) anticipates this idea in his interpretation of Gadamer: 
The basic idea is that we belong to this history and I can be aware of the history and this fact makes 
it possible for me to understand what is historically handed. Our understanding is of a historical 
object and yet it is reflected in my understanding[,] in awareness of its historical backing and source 
(36). 
One reading of Cheng’s statement here appeals to a sense of moderated receptivity: I can 
understand that my prejudices are historically handed, but not what they and, mutatis mutandis, 
their originating past exactly are. Furthermore, given the existence of other perspectives that share 
with mine a similar inheritance, I could then meaningfully attempt to understand them and the 
interpretations they condition.  
Indeed, Gadamer (2004) does believe that one can legitimately “see the past in its own 
terms” and “in its true dimensions” by “acquiring an appropriate historical horizon” (302. Cf. 
Vessey 2014, 372). The HEdC is a piece of the puzzle, whereby clarifying and understanding one’s 
own horizon – i.e., the set of prejudices informing our perspective – aids in understanding those 
of others. However, by coming to understand the horizon of, for instance, a past other, we are 
inevitably afforded important conditions for the “emancipation from our own” (Wang 2018, 569). 
Of course, emancipation cannot be conducted as an exercise in attaining some objectified point of 
view, for in learning about another’s perspective we are still informed by our own biases (Cf. 
Odenstedt 2005, 46; Segev 2007, 324). Nevertheless, becoming aware of other points of view is 
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edifyingly emancipatory by way of attaining the knowledge that our viewpoint is not the only one 
from which one can engage in interpretation (Gadamer 2004, 303). Acquiring a new viewpoint 
implies, according to Greg Lynch (2014), learning “to notice new similarities and differences in 
one’s experience, to join others in a shared way of taking interest in the world” (374). These 
similarities and differences are perspectival in nature and ameliorate our knowledge of the relations 
between our own perspective and those of contemporary and past interlocutors. The shared nature 
of this intellectual exercise is most apparent between contemporaries engaged in conversation, 
presumably because the dynamic nature of in-the-moment responses better facilitates mutual 
understanding of when points of interpretive commonality are arrived at. 
Now, Gadamer, in keeping with his theme of our inability to fully recreate perspectives 
other than our own (Gadamer 1976, 6), spends quite some time spelling out this apprehension of 
past experiences and other contemporary perspectives. To prime the issue further, we must ask, of 
what can hermeneutic goals viably consist? We obviously want to extricate ourselves from our 
own situatedness enough so that we can recognize alternative discourses, but not in such a way 
that we misguide ourselves on how historicity informs our ways of understanding such discourses 
(Cf. Marshall 2003, 125-6). Seeing others from their own horizons, whether past or present, is 
meant to afford accuracy in our interpretations thereof, yet how are we meant to gauge this 
accuracy if it can only be partial?2 I contend that how Gadamer attempts this, through the idea of 
 
2 Cf. Figal (2010, 13-5), for another criticism of Gadamer regarding the transcending of one’s own tradition for the 
sake of self-critique. Warnke (2014) argues similarly, in that if the notion of transcending one’s tradition requires at 
least the recognition of the tradition of another, then this notion conflicts with that of such recognition being 
inescapably conditioned by one’s tradition as also shared by that other. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to 
address these specific criticisms, a response to Warnke’s main thesis can be found in [Redacted]. 
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a historically effective consciousness, HEvC, of being open to the possibility of different 
interpretations hinging on a shared subject matter between the horizons of different interlocutors, 
yields troubling confusions, particularly from Gadamer’s appropriation of the concept of 
interpretive infinities pertaining to subject matters and horizons. 
I outline the notion of the HEvC in Section 2 before setting the stage for its problematic 
ramifications in Sections 3-6. I then tackle these ramifications in Sections 7-10 and offer up 
concluding remarks in Section 11. 
2. Historically Effective Consciousness 
Gadamer’s idea of a HEvC is intimately tied to that of the HEdC, wherein “[t]he general 
structure of understanding is concretized in historical understanding, in that the concrete bonds of 
custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in 
understanding itself” (Gadamer 2004, 254). In other words, the ways in which we understand 
another’s horizon is contingent upon both our effected biases and effective capacity to possibilize 
and project interpretations from alternatively biased perspectives (Cf. Cheng 2015, 38-9; Wang 
2018, 567). We can concretize the idea further: in interpreting a past text we project other 
possibilities of understanding by engaging with the horizons of others as sources of novel meaning 
and interpretation; when we dialogue with contemporaries we can project other possible ways of 
understanding them by letting them speak for themselves in apprehending relevant matters – e.g., 
their own horizons as interpretable objects. In either case, whether past or present, the enterprise 




How would one tell if another’s interpretation is relevant as a desideratum for one’s own 
understanding? Surely not all possible interpretations ought to be equally relevant, right? An 
obvious first approximation would be to ask whether different interpretations are dealing with the 
same object, as interpretations would be at least more mutually irrelevant if they deal with different 
objects as opposed to the same object. To be concise, we will term an object of interpretation – 
either a past text or even a contemporary horizon – as a subject matter. Consequently, in connection 
to the abovementioned shared endeavor for interpretive understanding stands a similarly shared 
subject matter between different horizons that makes said endeavor worthwhile (Cf. Segev 2007, 
325; Leiviskä 2015, 589, 599-600). A common subject matter allows for a veritable community of 
horizons situated not only contemporarily-spatially but historically-temporally as well. For the 
latter, historically connected yet temporally distant horizons are not completely incommensurable 
with each other in dealing with some subject matter; for the former, commensurability obtains 
between two present horizons interpreting some subject matter. Interestingly, the truth claims 
concerning a subject matter professed by horizonally originated interpretations are applicable even 
if these horizons are not historically related at all. Stated in another way, a subject matter that is 
culturally relevant to me can be unproblematically commented on by interpreters situated within 
completely different cultural horizons. 
Remember that we are trying to avoid a rampant relativism wherein all possible 
interpretations are relevant to our understanding of a subject matter, even those that supposedly 
have nothing to do with it. Understanding how this is sidestepped even by permitting non-
culturally relevant horizons to interpret culturally idiosyncratic subject matters requires us to come 
to terms with Gadamer’s understanding of how other horizons precisely speak to us interpretively. 
3. Encountering the Thou 
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 First, note that, given our inability to fully conceptually surmount our own historical 
preconditioning (Leiviskä 2015, 588-9, 596), we often have to rely on an other-oriented approach 
to aid us in this task. For Gadamer (2004),  
[i]t is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, 
but only when it is, so to speak, provoked. The encounter with a traditionary text can provide this 
provocation. For what leads to understanding must be something that has already asserted itself in 
its own separate validity (298). 
This provocation is possible because tradition as one’s own horizon is different from tradition as 
the subject matter of one’s own interpretations (Dybel 2011, 473-4), such that horizons familiar to 
us can become perturbed once they are treated as subject matters containing foreign elements. This 
encounter of the familiar with the strange and foreign is essentially the impetus for genuine 
interpretive understanding and is why Gadamer (2004) considers “[h]ermeneutic work [to be] 
based on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness” (295. Cf. Odenstedt 2005, 42). 
 How these foreign elements permit greater understanding is, as mentioned above, mediated 
through the HEvC of recognizing these elements as both potentially constitutive of and 
possibilizing different interpretations about a shared subject matter. However, this is the case 
wherein other horizons assert their own presence towards the subject matter. The other case would 
be when the subject matter itself asserts its own strangeness upon our horizons as not fully 
encapsulable within their interpretive purviews. From here we can see that the horizons of other 
interpreters share a function with their common subject matters: both, because they are registered 
as foreign elements from the point of view of one’s familiar horizon, act as objects of interpretation 
that, through the HEvC, effectively differentiate for one into alternatively possible interpretations. 
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The only difference would be that the subject matter is an actual object of interpretation while 
foreign horizons are still only potential objects of interpretation. 
 It is this shared feature, the assertion of strangeness, that is integral to how foreign horizons 
and subject matters speak to us hermeneutically, since by their assertion we are at once both 
distanciated from ourselves and made aware of them as different from us (Leiviskä 2015, 590, 
597). Following Gadamer (2004), we will collectively call whatever asserts strange and foreign 
elements to our horizon, the “Thou” (xxxii). The function of the Thou is not to present itself to our 
understanding as something that can be certainly known, but precisely as the Thou its alterity 
forces us to reconsider our own horizon against its characterization as one granting authoritative 
interpretations, a process that Michael Pickering (1999) regards as a dialectical process of othering 
both ourselves and the Thou (184, 194). The Thou validly asserts itself as another legitimate voice, 
one that addresses itself to us but nonetheless one that we cannot fully understand (Cf. Vilhauer 
2010, 84). 
 Now, the terms in which the Thou is revealed to us are precisely those that are revealed as 
different from our own familiar horizons. Whether this seeing of the Thou is conceived as an 
awareness of its “historical contexts” (Cheng 2015, 35) or its “productivity” in possibilizing 
different interpretations to our own (Leiviskä 2015, 597), most importantly these contexts and 
possible interpretations are not familiar to me. Furthermore, even if I may “see the [Thou] from a 
point of view constituted by [my horizon]” (Fristedt 2010, 491n14), this constitution is exactly 
what potentiates my seeing the Thou as strange in the first place. In Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
‘polarity of familiarity and strangeness’ the Thou occupies a position of strangeness that gives the 
HEvC its characteristic potentiating power, yet the familiar position, occupied by the familiar 
horizon working through the HEdC, interacts with the strange position by letting it help expand 
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the familiar position’s own interpretive purview. Additionally, from this interaction between the 
HEdC and HEvC we could induce a condition that renders some interpretations invalid, thereby 
revoking the rampant relativism that Gadamer wants to avoid. The condition for invalidation is 
that if an interpretation is considered authoritative, then we would obtain closer towards 
interpretive truth if by the Thou’s assertion of strangeness we rescind whatever authoritative self-
consciousness we possess (Cf. Fristedt 2010, 491n14). This is thus how the Thou speaks of itself 
“as a potentially valid claim of truth made upon oneself and one’s own world” (Leiviskä 2015, 
595. Cf. Barthold 2020, 49ff.). 
 The HEdC-HEvC relation may also further restrict the range of relevant interpretations for 
our understanding. David Vessey (2014) hints at it, in that “[s]tarting from” the perspective of our 
HEdC “limits the alterity of the [Thou] and therefore what we have to learn from it” (372). In other 
words, our historical conditioning, while potentiating recognition of the Thou as strange, 
nevertheless does not permit the Thou to express itself in random and arbitrary ways – proceeding 
from our own horizon limits whatever difference the Thou is recognized as to differences that can 
fall within our horizon’s perspectival jurisdiction. As such, the HEdC grants the HEvC an 
attenuated possibilizing capacity, regulating the range of even applicably non-authoritative 
interpretations concerning shared subject matters. Whether this entails a regulation of actually 
valid interpretations or just those that are attended to at any given time is explored commencing 
from Section 7. For now, let us specify exactly to what character of our HEdC Gadamer attributes 
the truncated tendency of the HEvC’s possibilization of the Thou for our own horizon’s expansion. 
4. Coherence of Horizons 
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 Remember that the HEdC constitutes our awareness of our historical conditioning and how 
we cannot fully transcend it. In regards to the linguistic formation of our HEdC, Gadamer (2004) 
has this to say: 
[E]very word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a whole, through which alone it is a 
word. Every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole 
world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it 
the unsaid, to which it is related by responding and summoning (454).  
The unsaid becomes what the HEdC is projected towards by the HEvC’s possibilizing tendencies, 
yet because the HEdC is never fully transcended, whatever is unsaid cannot be so significantly 
different from what has been said that the former, presumably, contradicts the latter. Why this is 
so is because the said, manifesting the facet of the HEdC that we are aware of at any given time, 
is conditioned by a mandate on logical coherence, expressed in Gadamer’s sense of the “fore-
conception of completeness” (Gadamer 2004, 294. Cf. Vessey 2014, 371). Because we are dealing 
with coherence, anything that is logically bound to a coherently apparent horizon cannot contradict 
it lest we enter a state of incoherence from which interpretations start to lose their relevance for 
our understanding of a subject matter (Cf. Cheng 2015, 16). 
 Now, the presence of the unsaid does not remain solely the property of the Thou, as the 
feature of the unsaid’s coherence to the said means that the latter can take up the unsaid in order 
to expand the very horizon of the said, thereby causing that horizon to reveal itself more to the one 
possessing it (Cf. Fristedt 2010, 476). This revelation of ever extending coherence in one’s horizon 
may be what motivates Gadamer’s claim that “everything that is language has a speculative unity: 
it contains a distinction, that between its being and its presentations of itself, but this is a distinction 
that is really not a distinction at all” (Gadamer 2004, 470). The being of language is the unsaid of 
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one’s familiar horizon, unearthed as a subsequent presentation via an encounter with the Thou. 
More precisely, we may regard the unsaid as the potentiality in our HEdC that becomes actualized 
through our HEvC, through a fusion between the HEdC and HEvC within their shared unsaid that 
leads to a subsequent expansion in the HEdC’s said (Cf. Vessey 2009, 534). The ‘speculative unity’ 
in language is one between the actual and potential features of our HEdC that is nonetheless unified 
to the actual and potential features of the Thou through our HEvC.  
This may be one way of reading Peter Fristedt’s interpretation of Gadamer’s claim above, 
wherein Fristedt (2010) argues that 
in experience I treat the things I come across as though they were things in themselves, as though 
they constituted immediate reality. To speculate is to rise above this ‘dogmatism’, and thus to 
recognize that how things present themselves to me is not necessarily how they are. However, the 
distinction between being and presentation is both made and superseded in speculation (477). 
Here, the relation between an experienced thing’s being and presentation is equivalent to the 
relation respectively between the unsaid and said of both our HEdC and HEvC. The said of our 
HEdC is what is initially presented to us as familiar, while the said of the HEvC presents the said 
of the Thou to us as strange. The unsaid of the Thou, granting for our purposes that it bars rampant 
interpretive relativism, is contingent upon the unsaid of our HEvC – i.e., the as of yet unelucidated 
ways in which the different validly applicable interpretations of the Thou’s being (subject matter) 
coherently relate to one’s familiar horizon. In short, what is initially said by our HEdC transforms 
into a larger coherence of what is subsequently said through what is left unsaid by the Thou’s 
initial sayings, prompted by the latter’s presentation as merely different from what had been 
initially said within the familiar horizon of our HEdC. 
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 To simplify the above description, we may state that the speculative unity of interpretation 
is constitutive of a ‘distinction between being and presentation’ that is, one, made in relating the 
said of our HEdC and HEvC to each other, and two, superseded in relating the unsaid of our HEdC 
and HEvC to each other: the account of the HEdC’s said is couched in terms of the identity of a 
familiar horizon while the said of the HEvC is in terms of the difference of the Thou; however, 
both accounts of the unsaid for HEdC and HEvC deal in terms of a coherently enlarging horizon 
by which a subject matter is better understood. Consequently, this speculative unity establishes 
that horizons function both in a coherent and open-ended fashion (Cunningham 2017, 35; Cf. 
Fristedt 2010, 475), expressive more of a disclosure of subjectively insightful rather than 
objectively correspondent truths by our limited understandings of some subject matter (Vessey 
2014, 361n2. Cf. Weinsheimer 2003, 159-60). 
5. A Common Language 
Due to our situating the present discussion in the above fashion we can now begin to answer 
the question of how to accurately evaluate different interpretations from our own as applicable to 
some subject matter. Of significance here is Gadamer’s famous claim that “[e]very conversation 
presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common language” (Gadamer 2004, 371), 
signifying that, during dialogue, one’s engagement with the Thou furthers one’s understanding 
insofar as a common language is involved. Now, we could conceive of this common language 
simply as the subject matter shared between me and the Thou as interpreters of this subject matter, 
but we should clarify: the Thou as subject matter, as an actual object of interpretation, is necessarily 
more extensive than any single interpretation given by the Thou as an apparent horizon, as a 
potential object of interpretation. How a common language then factors into this picture is as 
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follows: as a presupposed feature it factors as the shared subject matter, while as a created feature 
it factors as the coherently extended horizon that better understands the subject matter.  
This connection between language as subject matter and language as horizon is concordant 
with the Gadamerian claim that understanding is fundamentally linguistic (Gadamer 1976, 15; 
2004, 435ff.). Through language we are afforded experience’s interpretability (Cunningham 2017, 
50), suggesting that, according to Fristedt (2010), “anything we can understand is disclosed to us 
in language” (479). Language is therefore a natural part of our learning and conceptual apparatus, 
conditioning both the initial moment of experience and the procedural tools one may use to better 
understand that experience (Davidson 2005, 133; 2001b, 130). This is not to say that understanding 
is incontrovertibly linguistic, merely that we have a better argument for understanding as 
structured by language inasmuch as our horizon-contingent interpretive faculties and objects of 
interpretation are linguistically construed.3 Said in another way, we can more accurately describe 
the linguistic connection between horizon and subject matter in terms of language as both the act 
and object of interpretive understanding, respectively. Donald Davidson (2005) agrees as much 
here when noticing that “[c]oming to an agreement about an object and coming to understand each 
other’s speech are not independent moments but part of the same interpersonal process of 
triangulating the world” (275). 
The function of a common language in regards to our HEdC and HEvC is now clearer as 
well: a common language undergirding either both familiar and foreign horizons and/or a familiar 
 
3 Some readers of Gadamer find fault with his conception of understanding as fundamentally linguistic, leaning instead 
increasingly towards language as either symbolic of more basic non-linguistic experiences (Wang 2018, 568; Cheng 
2015, 19, 36) and/or interpretation as a more derived form of understanding in general (Cunningham 2017, 47). 
Nevertheless, it is outside the scope of this paper to engage with this debate. 
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horizon and a subject matter is obfuscated from the perspective of the divergence between the said 
of the HEdC and HEvC, but is uncovered from the perspective of the convergence between their 
unsaid.4 This divergence between the said of the HEdC and HEvC is akin to two distinct languages 
conceptually conflicting with one another. The convergence between the unsaid of the HEdC and 
HEvC portrays two distinct languages that are able, through dialogue, to unearth the underlying 
common linguistic ground from which a subject matter’s interpretive approach can be shared by 
both (Cf. Fristedt 2010, 475). Therefore, the answer to how one ought to evaluate the veracity of 
alternate interpretations by others of some subject matter is through seeing if you can come to a 
common language shared between you and another. This awareness of a shared common language 
is both prospective in the language’s creation and retrospective in its presupposition.  
What would the sharing of such a language look like? Gadamer proposes an additional 
methodological condition to the structural one on horizonal coherence as to what constitutes a 
proper interpretation: coming to interpret a subject matter necessitates a shared method of question 
and answer. The very process of coming to a common language factors heavily in Gadamer’s logic 
of question and answer as integral to understanding in general, which is why it is this logic to 
which we must now turn. 
6. The Logic of Question and Answer 
 For Gadamer (2004), the Thou as subject matter is best known “only when we have 
understood the question to which it is an answer” (363. Cf. Marshall 2003, 123). The process of 
questioning is meant to aid one in picking out the relevant interpretations of a subject matter 
 
4 This may be motivating Gadamer’s claim that even in misunderstanding there is still presupposed between the 
interlocutors a “deep common accord” (Gadamer 1976, 7). 
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precisely because these interpretations act as the appropriate answers to whatever question we may 
be asking of it. Indeed, the way in which Gadamer avoids allowing every interpretation as 
applicable to a subject matter is by limiting interpretive applicability to within the context of 
asserted questions. Moreover, how a subject matter is questioned is restricted as well, since what 
is important is that only “real question[s]” are asked (Gadamer 2004, 367; emphasis added). What 
then differentiates real questions from fake ones? 
 Notice first the peculiarity in Gadamer’s wording: he uses the term, “text”, as what counts 
as an answer to a real question (Gadamer 2004, 363). If we interpret ‘text’ as an object of 
interpretation, then this is commensurate with our usage of subject matters as texts to be 
interpreted. Now, it is the subject matter, not the horizon, that counts as an answer to a question 
asked of it. Additionally, for Gadamer (2004), the questioning of the subject matter “merges with 
our own questioning” (367), indicating that, while the subject matter provides the answers, our 
horizons are what provide the questions. Given this, and how historically situated we are 
concerning the way in which we experience and understand the world, it is thus no wonder why, 
for instance, Vessey (2014) remarks that “[t]he way texts contribute to contemporary 
philosophizing rests more on the questions the text addresses than the answers it provides” (362). 
If indeed we are conceptually and experientially limited from the horizons that we possess, it is 
consequently natural for our processes of interpretation and understanding to be structured more 
by the questions we can ask, sourced as they are from our perspectival limitations, than by the 
answers we can receive (Cf. Cheng 2015, 34). 
 The nature of what characterizes a question is also significant. Due to questions being less 
determinate than answers – multiple answers can be given for a single question – Gadamer (2004) 
regards “the real and fundamental nature of a question [as] to make things indeterminate[,] . . . [to] 
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bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing” (367-8). It is in this way that, because a 
question can “open the interpreter to entertaining multiple possibilities for belief”, one could 
understand a question as breaking “open the being of the thing in question – [the question] reveals 
the thing [i.e., subject matter] to be open to many possible interpretations or beliefs” (Fristedt 2010, 
486. Cf. Gadamer 2004, 356).  
Nonetheless, this breaking open of a subject matter’s being is not random and arbitrary 
once we understand that the origin of any process of questioning must begin from the horizons we 
already possess. What follows from this is the main distinction between real and fake questions: a 
question is real insofar as it is horizonally derived, meaning that it coheres with our own biases 
and perspective. We can interpret this distinction through Vessey’s claim that “all understanding 
requires some evaluation of the insights of the philosopher’s claims, independent of the 
justifications the author provided” (Vessey 2014, 361). A proper evaluation of someone’s 
interpretation must be based in some way outside the purview of their horizon, simply because 
what is intelligible to them may remain unintelligible to us if their horizon is not at the same time 
possessed by us. In appropriating the claims of another within one’s familiar horizon, we thereby 
allow for our horizon to expand and therefore judge their claims from the basis of an expanded 
horizon. Specifically, any initially unappropriated claim acts both as an interpretation without any 
rational association to an immediately accessible horizon and as an answer to a question that we 
have not yet asked within our horizon. If, in line with Gadamer, we must understand an 
interpretation as an answer to a question that we can ask, then whatever meaningful interpretation 
someone has for us about a subject matter must first be circumscribed within a logic whereby the 
interpretation is made into an answer to a question we can ask for ourselves; otherwise, that 
interpretation remains irrelevant to the subject matter for us, although it cannot be objectively 
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irrelevant, for it always remains a possibility that the interpretation can be re-motivated as an 
answer to an as of yet unsaid question. 
Relativism in what interpretations are applicable to some subject matter is thus avoided 
since, by viewing horizons as sources for questions, we are always open to questioning our own 
naïve answers in a fashion limited by the biases we already possess. Ascribing a function of 
questioning to horizons is not to say that we do not understand answers to questions through our 
horizons though – we do, since it is only through horizons that we understand at all (Vedder and 
van der Heiden 2014, 353) – merely that our horizons are primarily focused on sourcing questions 
relevant to our biases and perspective, or recontextualizing questions asked by others in ways that 
make them more intelligible to us. The answers can come from subject matters, but we can only 
truly understand an answer if we have a corresponding question for it. Indeed, letting a subject 
matter provide us with the answers to our questions is essentially how we properly encounter it as 
the Thou.5 
Gadamer (2004) writes that, in linguistic understanding, a person  
 
5 Gadamer (2004) also claims that the question to which the Thou as subject matter acts as an answer “can be derived 
solely from the [subject matter itself]” (364). This implies that subject matters act as sources of both questions and 
answers. However, given Gadamer’s later comment regarding the merging of the subject matter’s and our own 
questioning (367), it should not cause us problems to interpret the subject matter’s own questions as meaningful for 
our interpretations of a subject matter once these questions cohere with familiar horizons. Indeed, since we are 
emphasizing subject matters as sources of answers, then their own questions could influence the questions we ask by 
proxy of the answers that our questions must make intelligible (Cf. Pickering 1999, 192). Said in another way, a subject 
matter’s questions factor into the process of our hermeneutic understanding thereof indirectly through the direct 
influence of the subject matter’s answers on the questions we therefore have to ask in order to understand them. 
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is so oriented toward the particularity of what he is perceiving that everything he says acquires a 
share in the particularity of the circumstances he is considering. . . . [Here,] the general concept 
meant by the word is enriched by any given perception of a thing, so that what emerges is a new, 
more specific word formation which does more justice to the particularity of that act of perception 
(427).  
This particularity, if it is effective in changing the horizons within which our conceptual usages 
have meaning, is constitutive of the initial experience of the Thou as perturbing our familiar 
horizon with its strangeness. The particularity is also an answer to a potential question that we 
have not yet asked, which is why the answer is initially perturbing for us – only by questioning 
what is perceived (the subject matter) can that particularity aid in horizonal expansion and thereby 
be understood as an answer to a question. When understood, initially strange facets of our 
experiences now become expressive and disclosive of reality itself as linguistically and 
conceptually construed (Lynch 2014, 370n32). This process of conceptual application within novel 
experiences/perceptions to exert conceptual change by the logic of question and answer is seen by 
some as one of Gadamer’s main contributions to hermeneutics (Cf. Lynch 2014, 360-1, 372-3).6 
In terms of a common language, the act of questioning a subject matter makes attaining a 
common linguistic ground between interlocuters possible, for questioning opens the possibilities 
of how the subject matter reveals itself as potential answers to the questions asked. Consequently, 
it is entirely possible for questions to comprehend its potential answers as consisting of semantic 
linguistic elements that had hitherto been seen as facets of distinct languages. When this occurs, 
 
6 Ben Vedder and Gert-Jan van der Heiden (2014) call this process of conceptual application as putting prejudices “to 
the test” (353). 
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the process of questioning can effectively bring together different interlocutors under the banner 
of a common language.7 
It should also now be easier to connect the logic of question and answer to our previous 
discussion about the HEdC and HEvC. The similarities are striking: the process of questioning is 
precisely the function of our HEvC to possibilize how a subject matter is revealed to us, while the 
task of picking out answers within a context of questioning is how our HEdC grows and expands 
in the horizons that make those answers intelligible to us. Elsewhere, Gadamer (1986) likens the 
unearthing of the unsaid of an utterance concerning a subject matter to the “free play between the 
faculties of imagination and conceptual understanding” (29. Cf. Gadamer 2007, 253). Since the 
unsaid is a feature of both our HEdC and HEvC, we can interpret Gadamer’s statement in the 
following way: our horizon, and thus our HEdC, informs our conceptual understanding, while the 
application of our concepts to novel experiences and situations potentiates conceptual modulation, 
which is tantamount to the possibilizing function of our HEvC as an imaginative capacity. 
Relativism is avoided here because imagination is not unbounded – what the act of questioning 
allows one to deem as potential interpretive answers is constricted by what one can imagine. 
Moreover, if we want to authentically engage with the Thou, our imagination as an interpretive 
venture must be informed by how the Thou speaks to us, through its initial strangeness and the 
subsequent possibilities of its presentation as informed by our biased questionings thereof.8  
 
7 This is one way of conceiving dialogue as more effectively permitting the understanding of a subject matter by 
interlocutors better than non-dialogical understanding (Gadamer 2004, 361; Lynch 2014, 376; Leiviskä 2015, 590; 
Wang 2018, 574). 
8 A similar position is outlined in Sandel (2018, 367-9) in terms of a relation present between one’s mindful openness 
to novelty and one’s prior understanding that meaningfully potentiates this openness. 
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7. Infinite Dialogue 
 Let us now problematize the above discussion by considering what may be actualized 
through the creation of a common language and the subsequently coherent expansion of our 
horizons. Currently we have just outlined how these processes of creation and expansion are 
limited by the situatedness of the horizons within which they subsist. Nevertheless, some have 
taken these processes to be leading up to the manifestation of new value (Leiviskä 2015, 596; 
Cheng 2015, 11). Andrew Fuyarchuk (2015) similarly comments that the possibilities of the 
Thou’s presentation “announce themselves in language without being mistaken for anything 
actually said[,] which in turn moves thinking forward” (584). This furthermore concords with 
Gadamer’s own dismissal of criticisms towards question-contextualized answers that come from 
alternate question contexts as “pure shadow boxing” (Gadamer 2004, 364), as irrelevant and 
superfluous to genuine understanding. What to make of all this? 
 Remember that Gadamer’s condition of a ‘fore-conception of completeness’ is a mandate 
on coherence of the horizons used to interpret a subject matter. Additionally, we may also view 
interpretation as involving a dialectic between interpreter and subject matter: the subject matter’s 
answers condition an interpreter’s questions that thus expands the latter’s horizon, thereby 
permitting the interpreter’s engagement with a further process of questioning that makes 
intelligible even more answers from the subject matter; hence the process iterates continuously, in 
what Gadamer (1976) attributes as an infinite potency to the linguistic act of hermeneutic 
understanding, an infinite dialogue (15-6). Taken with Gadamer’s fore-conception we have a 
further mandate on coherence that conceives of the dialectic process itself as necessitating 
coherence – i.e., not just the self-coherence of the horizon but also its coherence with the subject 
matter at hand.  
21 
 
A natural issue arises from this: if answers are only intelligible when contextualized within 
questions, and the logic of question and answer constitutes a dialectically interminable process, 
then it seems entirely possible for interpreters to come up with contradictory interpretations about 
a subject matter. Does Gadamer just simply presuppose that subject matters provide answers that 
always avoid incompatible interpretive contextualizations? In other words, if contradictions can 
arise between interlocutors’ interpretations from an interminable dialogue, would it then be more 
rational to judge that further coherence-imbuing clarification of their interpretations will obtain, 
or that any subsequent coherence will just devolve into further incoherence? Relatedly, is 
Gadamer’s comment on ‘shadow boxing’ in criticisms lodged at different interpretations indicative 
of a deep-seeded conceptual uncertainty, if not relativism, in his logic of question and answer? 
 We could supposedly call the discovery of a coherence between interpretations as 
constitutive of a truth regarding the subject matter, yet the potential for further incoherence is 
worrying. Cheng (2015) acknowledges this worry in his discussion of a dialectic between theory 
as disclosive of truth and theory as presupposing a method: 
[T]he essential problem about the method is that it is always relative to a theory, and what is named 
truth could be simply what our theory defines to be truth and discovered by our method. Hence 
what [truth] we may arrive at … by using our method can be always questioned, because our theory 
of truth and its way of discovery can be always questioned (16). 
Cheng (2015, 19) also applies this issue to the notion of parts and wholes in linguistic 
understanding, in that how one comes to understand words and sentences is through dialogue, yet 
we understand the meaning of the dialogue by the words and sentences that structure it. In terms 
of the fusion and expansion of horizons, an endless dialogue would similarly imply its possibility 
to “produce a difference of horizons rather than their fusion” (Cheng 2015, 28. Cf. Marshall 2003, 
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138; Vessey 2009, 526). Moreover, in discussing the search for a common language between 
interpreters, Wang (2018) points to a corresponding dialectic in which we achieve this search in 
two ways: to understand the other’s language we must first clarify our own, yet to clarify our own 
we must engage with the other’s (567).9 
8. Infinite Horizons 
 Gadamer’s solution to this potential for incoherence, and thus the relativism inherent when 
two contradictory interpretations of something are taken to both be true, is intriguing. He regards 
the coherence of horizons as being ensured by their placement within a coherently infinite horizon 
that fully understands the subject matter at hand: all apparent contradictions are to be overcome 
(Gadamer 2004, 467, 535) to pass into “a single historical horizon” that contains all of “historical 
consciousness” (303), a horizon that expresses an infinite totality of meaning (464, 469). Fristedt 
(2010) ostensibly goes further than Gadamer, supposing the latter as implying that “a subject 
matter can appear in potentially endless ways to those who understand it[, such that] everything 
that could possibly be said about the subject matter … is just what the subject matter is” (478). In 
short, “all interpretations of a thing determine the thing together” (Fristedt 2010, 487).  
In practice this can only remain an ideal task, because this infinite horizon expresses an 
impossibly comprehendible interpretation of a subject matter for those with limited cognitions, 
 
9 Notice that this dialectic is not resolved by conceiving of the initial encounter of another’s language as simply 
different from our own in order to “come to a more sensitive and critical understanding of our own” (Wang 2018, 
567). This is because, just like for the dialectic within the logic of question and answer, there is always the possibility 
for incoherence to obtain between the languages, even after the initial perception of the other’s language as merely 
different from one’s own. Wang recognizes important ramifications of this incoherence, which are discussed in 
Sections 9 and 10. 
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which is why Fristedt (2010) denies that we could ever achieve such an interpretation and be 
rationally confident in asserting that we have achieved it (491-2n22; Cf. Beiner 2003, 152). Still, 
the notion of an infinite horizon corresponding to a subject matter at hand allows Gadamer a 
convenient out, because the possibility for further horizonal coherence trumps that of horizonal 
incoherence since the horizon itself is deemed a coherent one. We could thus gauge progress in 
our understanding of a subject matter by dialogically processing ostensible contradictions between 
interpretations to unearth a common linguistic ground permitting the transcending of the 
incoherence (Cf. Fuyarchuk 2015, 580). Considering that the ideal infinite horizon is coherently 
structured, and that any subject matter corresponds to one, any actually contradictory 
interpretations would be seen as both subsisting within incoherent horizons and interpretive of 
distinct subject matters, thereby relieving Gadamer of a relativist characterization wherein 
contradictory interpretations genuinely refer to the same subject matter. 
Why incoherent horizons deal with distinct subject matters is argued by Fristedt (2010), in 
that if  
those referents [i.e. subject matters] are radically different from how we understand them … then 
it makes little sense to say that we ‘understand’ or ‘describe’ those referents. …  For an 
interpretation to be said to be of something, it must be the case that that interpretation has access to 
the thing that it is interpreting – that the thing appears as itself in the interpretation. But this means 
that interpretation, as interpretation, must have access to being, and not merely to presentation 
(480).  
Davidson (2001a) makes a similar comment when discussing the coherence within sets of beliefs: 
Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true 
of false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine 
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the identification of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of a description of the 
belief as being about that subject. And so, in turn, false beliefs undermine the claim that a connected 
belief is false. …  It isn't that any one false belief necessarily destroys our ability to identify further 
beliefs, but that the intelligibility of such identifications must depend on a background of largely 
unmentioned and unquestioned true beliefs (168).  
We could interpret the point of Davidson’s comment to be that, because subject matters are infinite, 
an endless amount of true beliefs, as interpretive answers to questions, can apply to them, in which 
case a truly false belief would be incommensurable with the set of true beliefs constituting a 
horizon of interpretation. A false belief would therefore simply prevent ideal identification of a set 
of otherwise true beliefs with its subject matter if that false belief is taken to be part of said set, for 
the false belief may cohere with another set that is taken to be about a different subject matter 
altogether.10 
9. Incommensurable Horizons 
However, there is an issue, for Gadamer may not be able to avoid conceptual uncertainty 
in his hermeneutics despite avoiding conceptual relativism through his solution of horizonal 
infinity for the resolution of incurred incoherence. The issue is, how could one ever know if their 
supposedly true beliefs about a subject matter are settled? If beliefs can be subject matters up for 
interpretation – beliefs are intelligible within the context of horizons that themselves can act as 
objects of interpretation – then could these beliefs be infinitely interpretable as well? An easy 
rebuttal, based on the prior discussion, will not help here. It is as follows: the way one could rescue 
 
10 This may also explain what is going in in Fristedt’s example of how the subject matter of God can coherently 
accommodate the claims, ‘God is Love’, and ‘God is not Love’ (Fristedt 2010, 489-90), by making them cohere with 
each other in such a way as to disallow their separate inclusions in different horizons that are mutually contradictory. 
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an infinitely interpretable belief’s truth is by associating truth with coherence and argue that, one, 
interpretation always ideally progresses in the direction of coherent expansion of meaning, and 
two, subject matters ultimately are comprehended by a coherently infinite horizon of interpretive 
meaning; this would then guarantee that any genuine interpretation of a belief would entail the 
latter’s transformation into a coherently expanded belief, by which the truth value of the initial 
belief would persist.  
Why this answer does not work is because there is a fundamental limitation caused by our 
restricted interpretive capacities, that of an uncertainty whether true facets of a subject matter can 
ever enter into the coherent purview of even an infinitely structured horizon. All we need for us to 
motivate this concern is by noticing that once we require that distinct subject matters do exist, we 
must also necessitate the existence of horizons that are both distinct and infinite. As such, from 
this we are given the minimal condition of the possibility that different infinite horizons are ideally 
attainable. However, because they are practically unobtainable, two interlocutors will never be 
able to tell in practice for sure whether their seemingly contradictory interpretations can be 
rendered coherent within a more grounded common language or if they do truly belong to 
incommensurable horizons dealing with distinct subject matters. Furthermore, even if we take 
Gadamer to be arguing for the existence of only a single subject matter, such that no two horizons 
could ever become truly incommensurable, a similar concern would still endure. 
Lynch (2014) captures this concern through analysis of a case that applies a distinction 
between different horizons’ empirical and conceptual adequacies: 
Consider a relatively straightforward case of asymmetrical interpretation: Alice employs a simple 
predicate Φ that expresses a concept that is alien to Brian, but which is coextensive with the 
disjunctive predicate F v G in Brian’s language. Φ, therefore, expresses some property that Fs and 
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Gs have in common but to which Brian is insensitive. Suppose, however, that Brian constructs a 
theory of meaning T that renders Φ as simply equivalent to F and concludes that in those utterances 
where Alice applies Φ to Gs, she has made an error — she has mistaken a G for an F. … Ceteris 
paribus, T is just as empirically adequate as any rival theory T′ that treats Φ as expressing a concept 
that is alien to Brian. . . . [H]owever, T misinterprets Alice, while T′ does not (380). 
In a rudimentary fashion the empirical adequacy between T and T’ expresses two horizons 
engaging with the same phenomenal data. In terms of the HEdC (the consciousness of one’s 
historically conditioned horizon), this implies that the horizons of Alice and Brian both engage 
with the same unsaid between their respective HEdCs – i.e., the same subject matter – while 
difference obtains between the semantic elements of the said within their HEdCs. This is a case 
wherein both T and T’ could theoretically be subsumed within a larger yet coherent semantic 
system without either T or T’ losing their identities, given that Φ, as used by Brian, and Φ, as used 
by Alice, express different, and thus noncontradictory, predicates that just happen to nominally 
share the same symbol.11 Nonetheless, practically speaking, the lack of horizonal fusion between 
T and T’, which would expand them into a coherently extended horizon that would allow Brian to 
conceptually distinguish between T and T’, explains Brian’s current inability to make such a 
distinction. Additionally, if T and T’ instead are empirically distinct theories, meaning that they 
deal with distinct subject matters, then theoretically and practically Brian would not be able to tell 
them apart conceptually. 
The above case explains the worry of whether true facets of a subject matter can ever 
coherently factor within an infinitely structured horizon as being motivated by the possibility that 
 
11 Of course, Brian does not know this, so he would still regard his and Alice’s use of the predicate as contradictory. 
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two interlocutors may possess concepts alien to each other. According to Lynch (2014), “if an 
interpreter cannot tell ahead of time whether a given utterance expresses an alien concept, neither 
can he tell whether a given speaker possesses any alien concepts” (381). However, the worry can 
be motivated even if both interlocutors possess equivalent concepts, for not only does Brian not 
know that T misinterprets Alice’s use of Φ, but Brian could also not know that T’ correctly 
interprets Φ even if he uses T’. This is true iff T’ = F v G = Φ, and Brian knows that T’ = Φ but 
not that T’ = F v G nor that Φ = F v G. In other words, despite the properties of Fs and Gs not 
being identical, a combination of these determines T’ as Φ, and Alice knows of this fact while 
Brian does not. Here, both Alice and Brian use equivalent concepts of Φ, although they differ in 
the particulars of their recognition of this equivalency. In any case, regardless of the type of 
concepts employed by Brian and Alice, whether alien or equivalent, the mere fact that Brian is 
none the wiser regarding which type is instantiated means that, generally, no interpreter can tell 
for sure what concept is being employed by another (Cf. Beiner 2003, 156n21). 
10. The Hermeneutic Game 
The prior considerations are damaging for Gadamer’s hermeneutic account once we 
remember that a significant goal for him concerning interpretation is historical accuracy – i.e., 
seeing “the past in its own terms” and “in its true dimensions” by “acquiring an appropriate 
historical horizon” (Gadamer 2004, 302). Even if the appropriate horizon is construed as a 
singularly infinite one that does comprehend the subject matter, this still would not benefit one’s 
ability to gauge interpretive progress towards greater comprehension. This is because any 
persistently apparent contradictions attained by interpretations claimed to be about the same 
subject matter cannot be used to conclusively distinguish between their necessary coherence within 
a more general linguistic framework or their subject matters being necessarily distinct realities. It 
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thus seems as if the only feasible progress an interpreter can make is by focusing on maximizing 
coherence within their own horizons and not worrying about how a more comprehensive common 
language may be established with an interlocutor, either a past or present one, whose concepts can 
never be fully transparent to others. 
 However, even ascribing a mandate of maximizing horizonal coherence is not a cut and 
dry solution for Gadamer despite his notion of the fore-conception of completeness. There is 
ambiguity here, especially given the ways in which Gadamer has sometimes emphasized 
understanding in other terms besides those of coherence. For example, in discussing the relation 
between the values of rhetoric and logical coherence, Botz-Bornstein (2013) understands Gadamer 
to be noting that  
‘[n]obody will doubt that real conversations (. . .) can contain logical mistakes and imprecisions 
but are still capable of rhetorically suggesting the right and the true.’ What counts is the 
‘philosophical knowledge in [the conversation] and not in those things that are covered by the 
logical grid’ (260, quoting and translating Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1991, Plato im Dialog (Tübingen: 
Mohr), 110). 
This throws into question the relative importance that Gadamer would ascribe to logical coherence 
in one’s interpretations over and above their rhetorical suggestions. Indeed, the implementation of 
rhetorical rules, or just practical rules for understanding in general, takes center stage in some of 
Gadamer’s works – for instance, when he discusses his sense of phronesis (Gadamer 2004, 309ff.). 
Additionally, even within Gadamer’s discussions on both the theoretical and practical rules 
of hermeneutics there are still hints of underlying uncertainty informing his idea of understanding 
itself, such as when he claims that “[t]here are no rules governing the reasonable use of rules” 
(Gadamer 2007, 253). This would imply that there is no principled way of choosing between 
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different rule sets utilized for interpretive purposes, a position that Botz-Bornstein ascribes to 
Gadamer, in that, for Gadamer, “[t]he process of understanding is deprived of its (theoretical or 
methodological) ground and . . . can look like a game” (Botz-Bornstein 2013, 253). This 
hermeneutic game still attains rules for interpretation, which are characteristic of the 
semantic/linguistic rules informing an interpreter’s horizon, but these cannot be determined 
anywhere but within the game itself (Botz-Bornstein 2013, 261). In short, how one interprets some 
subject matter cannot be meaningfully operationalized unless one is already engaged in the act of 
interpretation itself, although whether a particular interpretive act is the right one for a subject 
matter can never be a decision that is principledly made. With this fundamental uncertainty 
clouding every instance of interpretation, the truth of the subject matter, according to Botz-
Bornstein (2013), cannot help but “hide behind itself . . . in a circular gesture” (257), one which 
forecloses upon any recognition of a genuine correspondence between a horizon and the subject 
matter it interprets (Cf. Botz-Bornstein 2013, 250). 
11. Conclusion 
This should not be surprising to us, given what we have discussed above regarding alien 
and equivalent concepts. If interpretive rules are what structure our horizons’ capacity to grant our 
experiences a sense of meaning, then our incapacity to distinguish between necessarily 
incommensurable and coherent horizons precludes any principled way of determining which 
interpretations to choose over others. Bringing the discussion back in relation with the logic of 
question and answer, we can see how this conclusion had already been anticipated: the 
requirements that, one, any real question to be asked of a subject matter must be based on one’s 
prejudices and perspective, and two, any real question must coherently comprehend an answer 
provided by a subject matter, both entail that as long as there is coherence established between an 
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interpretation and a subject matter, then interpretations accomplishing that condition will be 
relevant to the subject matter; this is so even if they contradict each other and therefore subsist 
within horizons that appear incommensurable with each other, which is a case that has been 
analyzed above with respect to the semantic theories of Brian and Alice.  
Consequently, the worry is not just that one cannot tell when they have adopted an 
authentically representative understanding of a subject matter, but that even the very idea of 
evaluating one’s progress towards that understanding is fraught with complications concerning 
veridicality. It seems then that we can point to at least a minimal condition on horizonal self-
coherence as constitutive of Gadamer’s sense of interpretive truth: attend to what is being said by 
some object of interpretation via asking questions relevant within your own perspective and that 
render what is being said intelligible for you. This however suggests a controversial implication 
that also may be espoused by Gadamer: the act of questioning and answering, the functional HEdC-
HEvC dynamic, amounts to a practical trajectory towards an interpretive truth that must express 
one’s subjectivity while also permitting irreconcilable incoherence with others’ subjectivities. 
Relativism may be avoided in theory, but whether interpretive truth is genuinely relative or 
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